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Abstract. The costs and benefits of policies designed to regulate the use of production contracts 
will depend in part on the impact of these contracts on farm productivity.  In this paper we 
measure the impact of contracting on 1) partial and total factor productivity and 2) the 
production technology for 479 US hog operations. A sample selection model accounts for the 
fact that unobservable variables may be correlated with both the decision to contract and farm 
productivity. Results also identify determinants of farmers’ decisions to contract and factors 
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1. Introduction  
 
The rapid increase in the use of production contracts is a notable feature of the structural change 
taking place in the US hog industry.  Between 1992 and 1998, the portion of feeder pig-to-finish 
hog operations engaged in contracting increased from 11% to 34%. At the same time, the share 
of output produced under a production contract increased from 22% to 64% (McBride; ERS-
USDA).  Several factors could be driving the growth of contracting including efficiency gains 
from contracting (on-farm or upstream and downstream of the production unit) and gains in 
terms of grower welfare.  Contracting may raise on-farm efficiency by raising the quality of 
managerial inputs or by speeding the transfer of technical information to growers. Contracts may 
also facilitate growers’ access to credit, allowing for the adoption of newer, more efficient 
technologies or capital equipment. Contracting could increase upstream or downstream 
efficiency by lowering transaction costs associated with product or input transfer, and by 
lowering information costs in terms of timing and product quality. Growers may benefit from 
contracting because of lower income risk, and contractors may be able to capture the risk 
premium.  
 
While the growth in contracting would seem to imply higher on-farm productivity, this is not 
necessarily the case. The increase in contracting may be driven by upstream and downstream 
efficiency gains and welfare effects that offset on-farm productivity losses. Contracting may fail 
to raise (or even lower) on-farm productivity if it reduces incentives for growers to work 
efficiently, or if it makes contractees less willing to invest in specific productive assets. In this 
paper we focus on identifying and measuring the farm-level productivity gains, if any, that can 
be attributed to contracting.  
 
Understanding the link between contracts and farm productivity is crucial to an analysis of the 
distributive and efficiency implications of the recent structural changes in the hog industry, and 
of policies to regulate contracting. The rapid growth in contracting has lead to efforts at the 
various levels of government to regulate contract production, both indirectly through corporate 
farming laws and zoning, and directly through legislation such as the “Producer Protection Act”    05/17/01  3 
(Boehlje et al).  These efforts to regulate contracting may have significant social welfare costs or 
benefits depending in part on how contracts impact hog farm efficiency.  
 
To measure the impact of contracting on farm productivity we must control for the fact that 
farmers who choose to contract could be quite different from those that choose not to.  
Contractees may be more credit-constrained, more risk-averse growers, have less preference for 
autonomy, and have less managerial or entrepreneurial ability. We use a sample selection model 
to account for the fact that many of the factors that determine both whether the farmer contracts 
and farm productivity may be unobservable.  Information from the 1998 USDA Agricultural 
Resource Management Survey of 472 feeder pig-to-finish hog operations is used to estimate the 
sample selection model.  We measure the impact of contracting on 1) partial and total factor 
productivity and 2) the production technology. Empirical results identify the determinants of hog 
farmers’ decisions to contract and also identify the factors that influence productivity.  Results 
also shed light on the long run implications of contracting for the scale of production. 
 
2. Reasons for Contracting and Impact of Contracting on Farm Performance 
 
There is a large body of research that examines the reasons why farmers and processors (or 
integrators) choose to contract. This past research provides insights into how contracting could 
impact farm productivity. 
 
Risk sharing is one of the mostly widely cited reasons for contracting. Under the terms of a 
typical production contract to finish hogs, the contractor provides feed, feeder pigs, veterinary 
care, managerial assistance, and marketing services. The grower is paid a fee for feeding and 
caring for the animals based on weight gain and feed efficiency. Hog contracts lower price risks 
for growers because their fees usually do not depend on input or hog prices (Johnson and Foster; 
Martin; Kliebenstein and Lawrence.)  While reducing risk, contracts also reduce farmer 
autonomy (Gillespie and Eidman). It is possible that autonomy-loving farmers with strong 
management skills may tend to reject a contract relationship that binds them to particular 
production practices.  Rhodes notes that “in the Cornbelt their [commercial feed companies and 
packers] efforts to contract hog production largely subsided within a few years. The better    05/17/01  4 
producers were seldom interested in the quasi-employee status that did not provide access to the 
profits of the good years of the hog cycle.”  
 
Because contractors supply such a large share of inputs, contracts drastically reduce the amount 
of production credit needed by growers.  Indeed, Kliebenstein and Lawrence note that in a 
survey asking growers why they entered contractual arrangements, lack of capital was the second 
most frequently cited reason (after risk reduction). Contracting could therefore serve to relieve a 
binding credit constraint for certain growers freeing them to invest or apply inputs at a more 
efficient level. Additionally, contract relationships may also make it easier for farmers to obtain 
loans for setting up or expanding hog production.  On the other hand, because hog production 
involves large investments in specific assets, contracting may make growers vulnerable to 
changes in contract terms.  If greater investment in specific assets reduces the bargaining power 
of contractees vis-à-vis the contractor, contractees may draw back from socially optimal levels of 
investment resulting in lower productivity (Shelanski and Klein). 
 
Contracts could serve to lower costs directly for growers by providing them with cheaper or 
superior technology, management techniques, or inputs. For farmers, hog production contracts 
may also reduce transaction costs associated with procuring inputs and in marketing – e.g., costs 
resulting from search, negotiation, monitoring, and transfer (Hobbs).  At the same time, 
widespread contracting in a particular area could raise costs for those growers who are not 
contracting.  Areas in which almost all production is carried out through contracts may have thin 
and poorly developed input or marketing channels so that independent producers would have to 
travel much further or experience greater difficulty in order to purchase inputs or sell their 
product (Laurence, et al).  
 
Costs associated with measuring hog quality may result in asymmetric information between 
growers and purchasers of hogs that can affect productivity. If there is asymmetric information 
about product quality, then farmers have less incentive to invest in raising quality because they 
cannot be fully compensated for this investment by the purchaser (Hennessy). Production 
contracts that specify the genetic characteristics of the hogs largely reduce uncertainty about 
quality. Hence, these contracts can reduce measurement costs associated with asymmetric    05/17/01  5 
information and may encourage investment in quality (Martinez, Smith, and Zering).  On the 
other hand, there may also exist asymmetric information about the quality of potential 
contractees, which could create an adverse selection problem for the contractor (Sheldon). 
Knoeber views the growers’ provision of productive assets as signal of agent ability under 
asymmetric information.  Hence, the capital requirement may act as a screening device resulting 
in the self-selection of contractees with high ability. 
 
Finally, if we are interested in measuring the impact of contracting on farm performance, we 
should take into account the fact that contractors choose to locate and expand production in 
regions where they can operate most profitably.  Desirable regions from the contractors’ 
perspective may be those where the opportunity costs to hog farming are low, or where there is a 
high density of hog producers, which lowers transaction costs.  While most hog farmers may 
have some opportunity to contract, the net benefits of contracting may be very low where the 
availability of contracting is limited.  
 
 
3. Empirical model 
 
To measure the impact of participating in a production contract on farm productivity we use a 
treatment effects model (Greene, 714). The net benefits to contracting compared to independent 
production and marketing are given by the latent variable 
*
i C : 
 
(1)  i i i u Z C + = γ
*   
       1 = i C  if  0
* > i C , 0 otherwise. 
 
where  i Z  is a vector of farm and regional characteristics. If the latent variable is positive then the 
dummy variable indicating contracting  i C  equals one, and equals zero otherwise. We are 
interested in measuring the impact of a production contract on a measure of farm performance 
i y :  
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(2)  i i i i C X y ε δ β + + =  
 
where  i X  is a vector of farm and regional characteristics.  More generally, we can allow 
contracting to interact with all the exogenous variables, in which case (2) becomes: 
 
(2’)  i i i i i X C X y ε δ β + + =  
 
where δ is now a vector of parameters associated with the interaction terms.  We cannot simply 
estimate (2) or (2’) because the decision to contract may be determined by unobservable 
variables (management ability, preferences for autonomy, regional characteristics, etc.) that may 
also affect performance. If this is the case, the error terms in (1) and (2) will be correlated, 
leading to biased estimates of δ .  We can account for this selection bias by assuming a joint 









































and by recognizing that the expected performance of contractees is given by: 
 
[] i i i i X C y E ρσλ δ β + + = = 1 
 
where  i λ  is the inverse Mills ratio. To derive an unbiased estimate of δ  we can use a 2-stage 
approach starting with a probit estimation of (1). In the second stage, estimates of γ  are used to 
compute the inverse Mills ratio, which is included as an additional term in an OLS estimation of 
(2).  This two-stage Heckman procedure is consistent, albeit not fully efficient.  Efficient 
maximum likelihood parameter estimates can be obtained by maximizing: 
 
() () ∏ ∫∫ ∏ ∫∫
=
∞∞
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where  ( ) i i y C f ,
*  is the joint normal density function, which is a function of the parameters. In 
practice, the log of the likelihood function is maximized using the estimates from the Heckman 






Data are used from two sources: the 1998 USDA Agricultural Resource Management Survey of 
the hog sector, and the 1997 US Agricultural Census.  Because of the broad differences in 
production techniques among various types of hog operations, we focus on feeder pig-to-finish 
hog operations.  This sector of producers has experienced rapid growth in contracting and 
accounted for about a third of total finished hog farms and production in 1998.   
 
Table 1 reports the results of tests of equal means between operations with contracts and those 
without for the variables used in the estimations.
2 The table highlights several clear differences 
between the two groups.  On average, contractees are younger and have much less experience in 
the hog business. Contractees are also more likely to have their major occupation be something 
other than farming or ranch work.  Contractees do not have significantly more total assets 
employed in farming, yet they produce over three times as much pork. 
 
Among the five geographical regions in which the sample is divided, contracting is significantly 
more common than independent production only in the east. Independent production is more 
common in all the other regions except the north, where there is no significant difference 
between the modes of production.  Contract operations are more likely to be located in counties 
with a high net cash returns per farm, and in counties with a greater volume of hog production.  
We did not expect counties with higher net returns to farming to be correlated with contracting, 
and as we find in our regressions discussed in the next section, once we control for operator, 
                                                 
1  See documentation for Limdep 7.0 for details about the optimization algorithm. 
2 In computing the difference of means, parameters, and significance tests in all the regressions in the paper, the 
survey data were weighted to account for sample design.     05/17/01  8 
farm, and other regional characteristics, the positive relationship between county average farm 
revenue and contracting actually becomes negative. 
 
Simple averages would indicate that contract producers are much more productive than 
independent producers: they produce much more per unit of feed and labor and capital, and have 
higher total factor productivity. While productivity measures of the two groups differ 
significantly this may be due to both observable and unobservable factors correlated with the 
decision to contract, rather than contracting itself.  Identifying the impact of contracting on 
productivity is the concern of the next section. 
 
5.  Results 
 
The Contract Decision 
Table 2 lists the results of the first stage probit explaining the decision to contract versus produce 
independently.  The model is significant and correctly predicts 84% of operators’ choices. Most 
variables had signs consistent with the differences in means discussed in the last section. 
Estimation results indicate that for an average operation, an increase in education or years of 
experience in the hog business lowers the probability that the farmer will contract, while having 
a primary occupation off-farm, raises the likelihood of contracting.   
 
An operation being located in an eastern state positively increases the likelihood of contracting, 
so did being located in a Northern state or not being located in a Southern state (all relative to the 
omitted region: Central Midwestern).  As expected, being located in county with more hog 
production increases the likelihood of contracting, while being in a county with a higher average 
net return to farming lowers the probability that a farmer contracts. 
 
We used scale of production categories in the regression equations rather than simply the scale of 
production for two reasons: 1) a size category can be considered exogenous to the farm in the 
short run – it depends on a large number of physical assets that cannot be easily scaled; and 2) 
the five categories allow for a flexible functional relationship between scale and the dependent 
variables.  As shown in the table, the scale of production has a strong positive correlation with    05/17/01  9 
the likelihood of contracting. Controlling for individual, regional, and farm level characteristics, 
being in a farm scale category other than the smallest increases the likelihood of contracting, and 
the increase in the size of the coefficients with the size group indicates that the probability of 
contracting increases with scale.  
 
Factor Productivity 
In order to estimate the impact of contracting on partial and total factor productivity, we assume 
factor productivity can be approximated with a linear function of the explanatory variables.  
There is no theoretical reason to expect county hog production nor county average farm income 
to affect on-farm productivity, so these are omitted from the equation.   The maximum likelihood 
estimates of the sample selection model are presented in table 3.  Contracting is significant in all 
factor productivity equations except capital. As shown in table 5, for an average hog farm, 
contracting raises feed, labor, other inputs, and total factor productivity by 39.5%, 55.5%, 47.3% 
and 23.7% respectively.  It is possible that not all of the returns to scale effect is accounted for 
with the scale class variables, resulting in the large productivity values for contracting – which is 
correlated with scale. This problem is addressed in our production function estimation in the next 
subsection. 
 
In addition to contracting, most of the indicators of scale of production were significant 
determinants of productivity, except in the case of “other inputs.”  Having off-farm work as a 
primary occupation increased the likelihood of contracting, but also, surprisingly, raises 
productivity. The number of years in the hog business has two confounding effects on total 
productivity: an extra year in business increases productivity directly, however an extra year in 
business also reduces the chance that farmer will contract thereby decreasing productivity 
indirectly.  The net marginal impact of an extra year in the business is computed to be positive 
but small (0.00854). 
 
Technology 
The second empirical approach measures the impact of contracting on the production 
technology, taking into account the selection process. We use a translog production function, so  
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(2’) takes the form: 
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where  ji ij β β = ,  i x are inputs,  i z are exogenous shifters, and  i C  is a dummy variable equal to 
one if operation i uses a production contract, and equal to zero otherwise. 
 
Table 4 reports the result of the maximum likelihood estimation where for convenience input 
levels have been normalized by dividing by their mean value.  The production function appears 
well behaved with the estimated marginal productivity being positive for each input. Parameters 
for the selection equation are very close to those obtained in the probit equation.  To test the joint 
null hypothesis of no technical difference between contractees and independent producers: 
 
0 : 0 0 = = = = m kl k H δ δ δ δ   for all  m l k , ,  
 
we conduct a likelihood ratio test. The likelihood ratio test statistic has a value of 93.43, the P-
value associated with the chi-square distribution with 24 restrictions is less than 0.001. Hence, 
we reject that null hypothesis that contractees and independent producers use the same 
technology. 
 
A discrete index of technical change can be constructed using the estimated production function: 
 
()









The index is simply the ratio of what can be produced using the contracting technology relative 
to what can be produced using the independent technology with the same input bundle  x .  We 
find that contracting raises productivity for an average producer by 28.6%. This estimate is in 
line with our earlier estimate of total factor productivity gains of 23.7%.    05/17/01  11 
 
Scale of Production 
To test whether contracting has a greater relative impact on smaller or larger scale operations, we 
compute the average input levels for average producers in the five scale classes i: 
 
()









i τ  for  5 ... 1 = i  
 
As shown in table 5, we find that for an average operator in each category contracting would 
raise productivity by 31.8%, 22.3%, 27.9%, 36.0%, and 35.1%, for categories 1 through 5, 
respectively. The results indicate that contracting does not have large scale-effects.  In other 
words, contracting appears to raise productivity for all size operations.  
 
A second relationship between contracting and scale is illustrated with the elasticity of scale, 









kl k x log β β ε . 
 
Based on the production function estimates we find that contracting lowers the average scale 
elasticity slightly from 1.153 to 1.140 for an average operation.  This result implies that hog 
production displays increasing returns to scale, and that contracting has little effect on the returns 
to scale.   
 
Selection Bias 
Selectivity bias results from correlation of the errors, indicated by the coefficient ρ .  There is a 
positive correlation in the capital productivity equation and the production function equation. 
The positive correlation between the errors indicates that there are unobservable factors such as 
farming skill or work ethic that are positively correlated with the decision to contract and 
production (the impact of contracting on capital productivity is not significant).  If we had not    05/17/01  12 





Contracting appears to enhance the productivity of three of the four inputs to hog production and 
results in 23.7% higher total factor productivity.  In addition, contracting was found to be a 
technological improvement over independent production resulting in 28.6% more output for an 
average farm. Interestingly, contracting alone does not cause farms to use significantly more or 
less capital per unit output than non-contracting farms.  In addition, a further analysis (not 
reported here) reveals no significant difference between contractees and independent producers 
in terms of their debt-asset ratio. Hence, contracting appears to raise productivity despite the fact 
that the contracting operations do not use more capital per unit output or take on relatively more 
debt.  
 
The higher productivity that results from contracting may be due to a transfer of “know how” 
from integrators to growers, a transfer that may be particularly important given the relative lack 
of hog experience of the contractees. This information exchange may involve know how 
concerning feed mixtures or feed timing that results in higher feed productivity and lower labor 
costs.  In addition, goods and services provided by the contractor such as veterinary care, feed, 
and especially the genetic quality of the animals may be superior to that available to an 
independent producer, resulting in healthier animals, and greater weight gain. 
 
The magnitude of the productivity gains that we estimate implies these gains are an important 
factor in the recent growth in contracting. There is a role for future work in discerning how the 
productivity gains are distributed among contractors and growers.
3  While the impact of 
contracting on productivity appears to be sizeable, there is little differential impact according to 
scale. This result suggests that the impact of contracting on productivity is not a major force 
driving the increase in the scale of production of hog farms that has been widely documented 
                                                 
3 McBride and Key examine the factors that affect the financial performance of contractors and growers in a contract 
arrangement.     05/17/01  13 
elsewhere. On the other hand, the production technology - which displays increasing returns to 
scale regardless of the contracting arrangement - does serves as a motive for increasing the scale 
of production. 
 
The higher level of farm productivity associated with contracting implies that policies to regulate 
contracting have economic costs. However, it is possible that negative producer welfare effects 
(loss of autonomy) or upstream and downstream costs to contracting (increased transactions 
costs) could reduce or even reverse the potential efficiency gains from contracting.  Hence, it is 
not possible to conclude from this study what the overall impact of policies to regulate 
contracting is on producers or society.  In addition, while the paper suggests that contracting 
raises on-farm productivity, it is important to stress that we have considered only standard 
accounting measures of costs and benefits, and have not considered non-market costs of 
production such as odor, water pollution, etc.  It is possible that contracting is associated with 
particular manure management practices that result in greater environmental costs (Kaplan). 
Future work might examine how production contracts affect production practices with social and 
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t-stat  Prob > t  
Operator Characteristics        
Age (years)  50.6  47.0  3.78  0.000 
Education (years)  13.0  12.9  0.06  0.953 
Major occupation is not farm or ranch work*   0.14  0.23  -2.41  0.016 
Years in hog business  24.1  14.8  9.03  0.000 
        
Farm Characteristics        
Total farm assets ($100,000)  7.69  8.79  -1.23  0.221 
Scale Class 1: Hog production (cwt.) < 750*  0.375  0.030  10.41  0.000 
Scale Class 2: 750 ≤  Hog production (cwt.) < 2000*  0.258 0.133 3.51  0.000 
Scale Class 3: 2000 ≤  Hog production (cwt.) < 5000*  0.255 0.266  -0.27  0.790 
Scale Class 4: 5000 ≤  Hog production (cwt.) < 15000*  0.093 0.298  -5.80  0.000 
Scale Class 5: 15000 ≤  Hog production (cwt.)*  0.020 0.273  -8.31  0.000 
        
Regional Characteristics        
Northern state (MI, MN, SD, WI)*  0.194  0.232  -1.02  0.306 
Eastern state (NC, SC, VI)*  0.014  0.205  -6.94  0.000 
Southern state (AL, AR, GA, MO, KY, TN)*  0.085  0.032  2.50  0.013 
Western state (CO, KS, OK, UT, NE)*  0.159  0.067  3.20  0.001 
Central Midwestern state (IL,ID,IA,OH)*  0.548  0.463  3.17  0.064 
County average net cash return per farm ($1000)   34.86  46.54  -4.64  0.000 
County average swine sales per farm ($1000)  23.63  70.73  -6.8  0.000 
        
Output and Inputs
(1)        
Hog production (cwt.)  3138  11036  -5.27  0.000 
Feed (cwt.)  11114  26710  -4.20  0.000 
Labor (hours)  1346  1614  -0.88  0.381 
Capital ($)  26745  62143  -2.99  0.004 
Other Inputs ($)  8844.9  27228  -3.17  0.002 
        
Productivity        
Feed Productivity (cwt. hog/cwt. feed) X 10
-1  2.69 4.34  -11.13  0.000 
Labor Productivity (cwt. hog/labor hour)  1.96  6.54  -13.50  0.000 
Capital Productivity (cwt. hog/$) X 10
-2 9.66  17.04  -11.75  0.000 
Other Inputs Productivity (cwt. hog/$) X 10
-2 50.01  65.84  -4.16  0.000 
Total Factor Productivity
(2) (cwt. hog/$) X 10
-2 2.04  3.29  -14.15  0.000 
        
Number of Observations  234  245     
 
All data are from the 1998 USDA-ERS ARMS except county-level variables, which are from the 1997 US 
Agricultural Census.  All operations are Means are weighted to account for survey design. Prob> t  is the two-tailed 
significance probability under the null hypothesis of equal means.  
*     Dummy variable equal to 1 if statement is true or located in region, 0 otherwise. 
(1)  Hog production is measured as hundredweight of hogs sold or removed under contract less hundredweight of 
hogs purchased or placed under contract, plus hundredweight of inventory change. Labor includes own and 
hired labor; Capital is the capital replacement value; Other inputs include veterinary, bedding, marketing, 
custom work, energy, repair.  
(2)  The total factor productivity is defined as the inverse unit cost. 
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Table 2. Binomial Probit Maximum Likelihood Estimates: Contract Decision 
 
Variable Coeff.  Std.Err.  t-ratio  P-value 
Constant 1.064  0.806  1.321  0.187 
Age (years)  -0.006  0.010  -0.608  0.543 
Education (years)  -0.166  0.051  -3.272  0.001 
Major occupation is not farm or ranch work   0.580  0.217  2.671  0.008 
Years in hog business  -0.022  0.009  -2.479  0.013 
Total farm assets ($100,000)  -0.009  0.008  -1.150  0.250 
Scale Class 2  1.480  0.292  5.074  0.000 
Scale Class 3  1.803  0.299  6.022  0.000 
Scale Class 4  2.374  0.307  7.726  0.000 
Scale Class 5  3.386  0.409  8.275  0.000 
Southern state (AL, AR, GA, MO, KY, TN)  -0.741  0.369  -2.006  0.045 
Western state (CO, KS, OK, UT, NE)  -0.387  0.276  -1.402  0.161 
Northern state (MI, MN, SD, WI)  0.340  0.190  1.790  0.073 
Eastern state (NC, SC, VI)  0.897  0.453  1.980  0.048 
Co. average net return per farm ($1000)   -0.016  0.006  -2.679  0.007 
Co. average swine sales per farm ($1000)  0.007  0.003  2.141  0.032 
 
 
Dependent variable: Uses a Production Contract; Number of observations: 479      
Log likelihood function: -185.0746; Restricted log likelihood: -331.8912      
Chi-squared: 293.6332; Degrees of freedom: 15; Significance level: 0.000    
  
 
 Predicted  
Actual 0 1  Total 
0 204  30  234 
1 48  197  245 
Total 252 227  479 
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Table 3. Selection Model Maximum Likelihood Estimates: Partial and Total Factor Productivity 
 
 Feed  Labor  Capital  Other  Inputs  TFP 
  Coeff. P-value  Coeff. P-value  Coeff. P-value  Coeff. P-value  Coeff. P-value 
            
Selection Equation            
Constant  1.192 0.186 1.114 0.228 0.298 0.638 1.038 0.265 1.076 0.238 
Age  -0.008 0.435  -0.007 0.533  -0.003 0.673  -0.006 0.601  -0.006 0.596 
Education    -0.175 0.002  -0.167 0.005  -0.089 0.029  -0.165 0.008  -0.168 0.005 
Off-farm occup.  0.594 0.013 0.583 0.016 0.210 0.218 0.575 0.019 0.580 0.016 
Years  in  hog  bus.  -0.021 0.030  -0.022 0.026  -0.013 0.073  -0.023 0.020  -0.023 0.021 
Total  farm  assets    -0.008 0.402  -0.008 0.510  -0.015 0.001  -0.009 0.378  -0.009 0.352 
Scale  Class  2  1.475 0.000 1.451 0.000 0.813 0.002 1.453 0.000 1.459 0.000 
Scale  Class  3  1.879 0.000 1.774 0.000 1.066 0.000 1.783 0.000 1.808 0.000 
Scale  Class  4  2.419 0.000 2.385 0.000 1.327 0.000 2.356 0.000 2.378 0.000 
Scale  Class  5  3.362 0.000 3.344 0.000 2.798 0.000 3.368 0.000 3.358 0.000 
Southern  state    -0.549 0.261  -0.693 0.139  -0.589 0.054  -0.754 0.111  -0.706 0.130 
Western  state    -0.450 0.245  -0.391 0.271  -0.071 0.748  -0.386 0.301  -0.384 0.291 
Northern  state    0.360 0.066 0.335 0.113 0.299 0.061 0.323 0.124 0.351 0.082 
Eastern  state    0.878 0.214 0.911 0.202 0.752 0.047 0.844 0.235 0.896 0.192 
Co.  farm  net  return   -0.015 0.056  -0.015 0.061  -0.005 0.345  -0.015 0.096  -0.016 0.039 
Co. swine sales per 
farm  
0.007 0.162 0.006 0.199 0.004 0.273 0.007 0.190 0.007 0.158 
            
Factor 
Productivity 
          
Constant  3.550 0.000 3.961 0.002 6.561 0.013  52.647 0.027 2.353 0.000 
Age  0.003 0.764  -0.044 0.001  -0.010 0.729 0.240 0.392  -0.007 0.080 
Education    -0.134 0.007  -0.106 0.190  -0.262 0.135  -1.808 0.170  -0.088 0.000 
Off-farm occup.  0.592 0.005  -0.360 0.326 0.959 0.137  -9.043 0.196 0.094 0.381 
Years  in  hog  bus.  0.009 0.317 0.016 0.271 0.040 0.227 0.126 0.609 0.012 0.001 
Total  farm  assets    0.003 0.766 0.030 0.000  -0.036 0.159  -0.096 0.732 0.001 0.745 
Scale  Class  2  0.504 0.028 0.299 0.722 2.792 0.012 8.746 0.235 0.694 0.000 
Scale  Class  3  0.719 0.021 1.229 0.079 5.729 0.000 7.547 0.329 1.206 0.000 
Scale  Class  4  1.164 0.000 3.500 0.000  10.293 0.000 5.997 0.499 1.798 0.000 
Scale  Class  5  1.415 0.000 7.354 0.000  15.974 0.000 5.900 0.596 2.280 0.000 
Southern  state    0.776 0.005 0.834 0.113 4.164 0.000  22.297 0.003 0.654 0.000 
Western  state    -0.054 0.861 0.586 0.219 0.862 0.244  20.321 0.001 0.388 0.000 
Northern  state    0.050 0.784 0.392 0.370 1.876 0.007  -4.262 0.521 0.375 0.000 
Eastern  state    -0.139 0.702 1.050 0.014 2.164 0.043  -25.304 0.061  -0.309 0.049 
Contract  1.289 0.000 1.960 0.000  -0.052 0.945  26.218 0.000 0.586 0.000 
            
Sigma  1.468 0.000 2.439 0.000 6.050 0.000  39.242 0.000 0.700 0.000 
Rho  -0.190 0.201  -0.088 0.603 0.812 0.000  -0.095 0.568  -0.050 0.737 
            
 
Table presents maximum likelihood parameter estimates for sample selection model. Dependent variable in the 
selection equation is Contract (1,0); Dependent variables in the Factor Productivity equations are feed, labor, capital, 
other inputs, and total factor productivity. The P-value is the value for a two-tailed test of the hypothesis that the 
coefficient equals zero.    05/17/01  18 
Table 4. Selection Model Maximum Likelihood Estimates: Production Function 
 
 Coeff.  P-value     Coeff. P-value 
          
Selection Equation       Production Function (cont.)    
Constant 0.836  0.395    Age  0.005  0.142 
Age -0.004  0.739    Education    0.003  0.839 
Education   -0.164  0.014   Major occup. off-farm -0.100 0.112 
Major occup. off-farm  0.661  0.024   Years in hog business  0.001  0.689 
Years in hog business  -0.020  0.090   Total farm assets   0.003  0.465 
Total farm assets   -0.011  0.457   Southern state   0.220  0.014 
Scale Class 2  1.519  0.001   Western state   0.208  0.006 
Scale Class 3  1.919  0.000   Northern state   -0.080  0.167 
Scale Class 4  2.460  0.000   Eastern state   0.013  0.941 
Scale Class 5  3.499  0.000   C (Contract)  1.468  0.006 
Southern state   -0.863  0.059   C*lnx1  0.030  0.824 
Western state   -0.458  0.312   C*lnx2  -0.017  0.900 
Northern state   0.365  0.126   C*lnx3  -0.121  0.493 
Eastern state   0.932  0.202   C*lnx4  0.095  0.379 
Co. farm net return   -0.014  0.122   C*lnx1lnx1  -0.164  0.127 
Co. swine sales per farm   0.005  0.344   C*lnx2lnx2  0.141  0.206 
      C*lnx3lnx3  0.405  0.077 
Production Function      C*lnx1lnx2  0.246  0.166 
Constant -1.271  0.000    C*lnx1lnx3 -0.054  0.847 
lnx1 0.588  0.000    C*lnx2lnx3  -0.557  0.016 
lnx2 0.100  0.283    C*lnx4lnx4  -0.011  0.907 
lnx3 0.402  0.000    C*lnx1lnx4  0.311  0.052 
lnx4 0.063  0.474    C*lnx2lnx4  0.017  0.913 
lnx1lnx1 -0.016  0.661    C*lnx3lnx4 -0.401  0.035 
lnx2lnx2 -0.132  0.032    C*Age  -0.006  0.278 
lnx3lnx3 -0.027  0.718    C*Education    -0.047  0.141 
lnx1lnx2  0.014  0.856   C*Major occup. off-farm 0.211 0.118 
lnx1lnx3  -0.009  0.905   C*Years in hog business  -0.003  0.563 
lnx2lnx3  0.108  0.255   C*Total farm assets   -0.002  0.773 
lnx4lnx4  -0.019  0.713   C*Southern state   0.093  0.708 
lnx1lnx4  0.043  0.541   C*Western state   -0.467  0.010 
lnx2lnx4  0.035  0.686   C*Northern state   0.116  0.328 
lnx3lnx4  0.000  1.000   C*Eastern state   0.013  0.953 
           
       Sigma  0.356  0.000 
       Rho  0.402  0.032 
           
Table presents maximum likelihood parameter estimates for sample selection 
model. Dependent variable in the selection equation is Contract (1,0); Dependent variable in the 
Production Function equation is log of production (x10
-4). The P-value is the value for a two-tailed test of the 
hypothesis that the coefficient equals zero. In the regression all inputs (x1=feed, x2=labor, x3=capital, x4=other) 
have been normalized relative to the sample mean. 
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Table 5. Impact of Contracting on Factor Productivity and Production Technology 
 
Variable     
    
Factor Productivity   Contract/Independent  Input Cost Share 
Partial Factor Productivity     
     Feed  1.439  0.616 
     Labor  1.663  0.101 
     Capital  0.995*  0.203 
     Other Inputs  1.545  0.079 
Total Factor Productivity  1.257  n.a. 
    
Production Technology   Contract/Independent  Share of Operations 
Output    
     All Operations  1.286  1.000 
     Scale Class 1  1.318  0.256 
     Scale Class 2  1.223  0.215 
     Scale Class 3  1.279  0.259 
     Scale Class 4  1.360  0.164 
     Scale Class 5  1.351  0.107 
    
 Contract  Independent 
Elasticity of Scale  1.140  1.153 
    
 
* Parameter on contract dummy variable is not significant in capital productivity equation. Input cost share and 
share of operations are weighted to account for the survey design. 
 